The discovery of von Economo neurons within macaque insular cortex by Evrard et al. (2012) described in this issue of Neuron promises a valuable experimental model to characterize their functional roles. One hypothesis, now open to wider interrogation, is that these intriguing cells mediate self-referential processes underlying or dependent upon consciousness awareness.
Von Economo neurons (VENs) enjoy an (often unspoken) reputation as a potential neural correlate of consciousness and its expression within complex social behaviors. Comparative neuroanatomy underlies these ambitious claims: VENs were found initially only in humans and hominid primates (i.e., gorilla, chimpanzee, orangutan) and were thought to be absent in gibbons, monkeys, prosimians and other species (Nimchinsky et al., 1999; Allman et al., 2011) . Highest VEN density is found in the human brain and, across the great apes, VEN densities appear distributed in a manner seemingly proportionate with human-like social cognitive abilities. In hominids, the localization of VENs within anterior cingulate and anterior insular cortices also suggests that VENs may underpin the contribution of these regions to aspects of human conscious awareness, including higherorder thought and emotional feeling states. VENs are large projection neurons, a feature consistent with a role in ''workspace'' functional architectures proposed to underlie conscious access generally (Dehaene and Changeux, 2011) . However, detailed characterization of VENs in terms of neurophysiology (what information is processed) and connectivity (where this information goes) has so far been unavailable. The observation of VENs in the macaque brain (Evrard et al., 2012) therefore opens an accessible route for much-needed detailed functional characterization of these distinctive projection neurons.
At the same time, the discovery also prompts a revision of assumptions regarding the phylogenetic emergence of VENs and their association with large brain size. Although previously sought in macaque brains (e.g., Nimchinsky et al., 1999; Butti and Hof, 2010) , the presence of VENs in a discrete agranular region of macaque anterior insula has only just come to light through advanced microscopic methods and dense sampling of cortical sections. Beyond hominid primates, VENs have now been observed in the insula of a subset of mammalian species including elephant, whale, dolphin, walrus, and manatee. All these animals have large brains, ''complex sociality,'' and gravitational or aquatic demands on their autonomic physiology (Butti and Hof, 2010) . There is a danger perhaps of reading too much into these wider associations, e.g., VENs are also observed in the common zebra. Nevertheless, understanding how VENs contribute to cognitive and behavioral functions relevant to human health and illness so far has been limited by the absence of an applicable experimental model. Evrard et al. (2012) examined the brains of two species of macaque, rhesus and cynomolgus, which are the most commonly studied old-world monkeys in experimental settings. A combination of Nissl staining with cresyl violet and immunohistochemistry was used to identify neuronal types including VENs, which are characterized by having an elongated cell body, long and thick apical dendrites with narrow lateral extension, and a single basal dendrite (Watson et al., 2006; Nimchinsky et al., 1999; Seeley et al., 2012) . Macaque VENs were identified by this distinctive morphology among typical pyramidal cells in cortical layer 5b. Other feature criteria, such as a lack of dendritic branching on Golgi stain, increased their specific identification. Importantly, Evrard et al. (2012) were rigorous in demonstrating through a combination of methods that the cells were not misidentifed large inhibitory interneurons. Notably, by virtue of the brains having been previously used in tract-tracing studies, some of the VENs (in four monkeys) happened to have been retrogradely labeled from other regions with cholera toxin or a fluorescent dye, confirming them as projection neurons. In addition, the researchers were able also to refer to sections of a human brain stained with cresyl violet. Macaque VENs were seen in a small region of agranular insular cortex of both species (alongside a related neuron type, fork cells). In smaller numbers, VENs were also observed in anterior cingulate cortex and parts of ventral and medial prefrontal cortex. Cells were counted with high-resolution optical dissection and fractionation. VEN densities were in general less than those seen in great apes and humans, representing up to 3% of layer 5 neurons. Interestingly, macaque VENs share with human VENs immunopositivity for proteins associated with psychiatric disorders and/or autonomic control. These include disrupted-in-schizophrenia-1 (DISC-1), the serotonin receptor 5ht 2b r, and the dopamine D3 receptor.
The structure and size of VENs, including the long and thick basal and apical dendrites, indicates a role in relaying the outputs of cortical columns (Watson et al., 2006) and long-range interregional communication (Nimchinsky et al., 1999) , a view that is supported by observed reductions of human VEN numbers in agenesis of corpus callosum and frontotemporal dementia. Correspondingly, hominid VEN-containing brain regions show enhanced connectivity with frontotemporal regions including prefrontal cortex, amygdala, and septum (Allman et al., 2011) and contribute to functional networks implicated in salience detection, attention, and sensorimotor control (Cauda et al., 2012) . Interestingly, Evrard et al. (2012) draw attention to circumstantial evidence and preliminary tract-tracing data suggesting that the projection targets of VENs may be distinct from those of other neurons within anterior insula (and anterior cingulate). Rather, VENs may have longer projections: Evrard et al. (2012) give evidence for sparse connectivity to anterior cingulate and contralateral insula, yet speculate a greater concentration of projections to brainstem targets including periaqueductal gray (PAG) and parabrachial nucleus (PBN). These structures are proximally involved in the efferent control of the internal state of the body through the autonomic nervous system and in its afferent visceral sensory mapping, i.e., interoception (the sense of internal physiological state). Interoceptive pathways can be distinguished from those of other sensory modalities and have a primary cortical mapping within insula. Interoceptive information is further integrated with other representations within anterior insula (perhaps particularly in the right hemisphere), resulting in an enriched encoding of motivational salience. Importantly, human anterior insula cortex appears to support conscious access to both the interoceptive information and associated integrated representations of how encoded objects and concepts relate to the (biological) self (Singer et al., 2009; Craig, 2011) .
In von Economo's description of VENs as rod or corkscrew cells, he recognized the association between the VEN-containing regions (anterior insular and cingulate cortices) and autonomic function, speculating ''a cerebral representation of the autonomic or sympathetic nervous systems in particular areas of the insula'' (Seeley et al., 2012) . A link to the control of internal state and associated motivations is also indicated by biochemical study of human VENs demonstrating the presence of proteins linked to control of digestion, ''stress,'' pain, and immune reactions (Allman et al., 2011) . The lateralized preponderance of VENs within right insula (Allman et al., 2011; Evrard et al., 2012) is also arguably suggestive of a role in interoceptive representation (Craig, 2011) . Evrard et al. (2012) propose that VENs may contribute to interoception by providing inhibitory feedback from insula presumably to earlier (brainstem) levels of interoceptive representation. This notion is not dissimilar from our hypothesis that ''interoceptive predictive coding'' underpins integrative processing necessary for self-representation that ultimately supports conscious awareness (Seth et al., 2011 ).
An influential concept emphasizes the importance of internal states of arousal as the origin of feelings and the primary reference for a continued sense of self (e.g., Damasio, 2010) . While this notion is embedded within modern expressions of the James-Lange theory, its origin within the Western tradition perhaps dates back to Aristotle. Aligned with this notion, insular cortex supports a neural representation of changes in internal arousal states, and, within anterior insular cortex, the re-representation of this information is proposed to underlie subjective emotional feelings and their abstraction to both the encoding of future risk and the experience of empathic feeling for others (Singer et al., 2009; Craig, 2011) . The mechanics of how these processes might be implemented have been rather more elusive. However, a maturing understanding of the brain as a hypothesis-testing or ''Bayesian'' machine, as first formulated by von Helmholtz and as more recently expressed within the framework of predictive coding or ''free energy minimization'' (Friston, 2010) , are making such questions increasingly tractable.
Von Helmholtz conceived of perception as a process of inference on the causes of sensory input. This process is, however, confronted by the ambiguities arising from the many-to-many relations between sensory signals and their potential causes (i.e., a particular sensory input could have many different causes, and a particular cause in the world could have many different sensory effects). The predictive coding framework addresses this challenge by proposing that the brain maintains hypotheses (''generative models'') of the causes of sensory input. These models furnish predicted inputs, which are compared with actual sensory input, with mismatches (''prediction errors'') being used to update the generative models in an iterative, never-ending process of prediction error minimization following the principles of Bayes (Friston, 2010) . Applied to sensory perception mediated by cortical hierarchies, bottom-up signals originating in sense data are suggested to convey prediction errors, while top-down signals specify the content of the generative models determining perceptual content; predictions are generated and compared at multiple cortical levels via hierarchical Bayesian inference. We have recently suggested that a similar principle might also apply to interoception, wherein subjective feeling states arise from predictive inferences on the causes of interoceptive signals (Seth et al., 2011;  see Figure 1 ). This ''interoceptive predictive coding'' model is compatible with James-Lange inasmuch as feelings are understood to arise from perceptions of physiological changes; it also generalizes to so-called two-factor theories of emotion, which have long recognized that subjective feelings can be influenced by cognitively explicit beliefs about the causes of physiological changes. According to this model, hierarchical Bayesian modeling of the internal state of the body presents a possible mechanism for self-representation through subjective feeling states. Importantly, the integrity of such a representation depends on efficiency of the predictive model, a process to which VENs may be critical.
In humans, the anterior insular cortex provides a natural locus for comparator mechanisms underlying interoceptive predictive coding, as indicated by its demonstrated importance for interoceptive representation and observations of reward-related prediction error signals in a variety of contexts (Seth et al., 2011; Palaniyappan and Liddle, 2012; Singer et al., 2009) . Fast VEN-mediated connections within the salience network incorporating ''visceromotor'' anterior cingulate cortex would allow the swift updating of generative models, supported by efficient transmission and registration of visceromotor and viscerosensory signals to and from subcortical nodes in the PBN and PAG. While so far these connections remain speculative (Craig, 2011) , the discovery of Evrard et al. (2012) now renders their presence experimentally testable. More prospectively, examining neurophysiological responses of VENs could reveal explicit prediction error signals, a key test for all predictive coding frameworks and again one that may be enabled by a relevant experimental model. Evrard et al. (2012) themselves note potential implications of their findings for understanding consciousness, focusing on self-consciousness and social awareness. This focus aligns with evidence implicating hominid anterior insular cortex in extended forms of self-awareness in both individuals and social contexts (Singer et al., 2009) . A challenge to this view is that macaques do not appear to pass standard mirror tests for selfrecognition, at least not reliably. However, it is plausible that the phylogenetic development of VEN-mediated salience networks, originating from pressure for more efficient homeostatic control, has led to a spectrum of self-consciousness. These representations would share fundamentally a ''minimal self-hood'' through biological integrity, but they would build from this all the way to social expressions of self-hood that incorporate intersubjective predictions of emotional responses. This view is consistent with the greater concentrations (and size) of VENs in hominids as compared to macaques and remains compatible with notions of interoceptive predictive coding. A related hypothesis is that VENs may mediate a ''global workspace'' functional architecture (Dehaene and Changeux, 2011) , still anchored on interoceptive and emotional signaling, by virtue of providing fast functional connections between salience hubs in insular and cingulate cortices to widely separated brain areas.
Most psychiatric disorders impact upon the integrity of self-representation. This impact can be expressed at multiple levels including, for example, the vegetative and motivational symptoms that accompany social withdrawal and selfcritical cognitions in depression, the visceral arousal and exaggerated selfreference in anxiety disorders, or the perceptual distortions that accompany aberrant reality testing in psychosis. Correspondingly, dysfunction of anterior insular cortex is linked to social deficits, anxiety states, and the expression of dissociative and psychotic symptoms. It is perhaps psychosis, particularly schizophrenia, that most typifies a core disturbance of self-consciousness in awake attentive individuals (Fletcher and Frith, 2009; Palaniyappan and Liddle, 2012) . While other psychiatric symptoms involving anterior insula dysfunction might involve disordered prediction (Singer et al., 2009; Seth et al., 2011) , schizophrenia is perhaps most open to understanding in terms of dysfunctional predictive mechanisms (Fletcher and Frith, 2009 ). As mentioned, human VENs express proteins (notably DISC-1) linked to schizophrenia, and VEN density (in anterior cingulate) is linked to illness duration and completed suicide in psychotic patients (Allman et al., 2011) . A developed macaque experimental model of neural substrates for consciousness grounded in the anterior insula cortex may thus provide a unique and much-needed avenue into pathophysiology of psychiatric disorders, especially schizophrenia. Evrard et al. (2012) 's important discovery naturally raises the question of how broadly VENs might be distributed across animal species that have experimental relevance. Just as their presence in macaque anterior insula opens substantial new experimental opportunities specific to this animal, should further investigations uncover VENs or similar neurons in animals such as rats or even mice, yet more opportunities would emerge. For example, optogenetic manipulation of VEN expression and activity could potentially provide elegant experimental insight into VEN contributions to cognitive representations and behavior. The characterization of VENs is likely to benefit also from the acceleration in the application of other genetic experimental approaches (including gene knockout and knockin In this model, subjective feeling states are constituted by continually updated predictions of the causes of interoceptive input. In close analogy with predictive coding models of sensory perception, these predictions are shaped by generative models informed by ''efference copies'' of visceral, autonomic, and motor control signals. Predictions are generated, compared, and updated within a salience network anchored on the anterior insular and anterior cingulate cortices with engagement also of brainstem regions including periaqueductal gray (PAG) matter and parabrachial nucleus (PBN) as targets for visceromotor control and relays of afferent interoceptive signals. Self-consciousness is grounded on the feeling states that emerge from interaction of interoceptive predictions and prediction errors. In this context, VEN populations within the salience network, including its subcortical nodes in the PAG and PBN, would enable efficient registration of afferent and efferent signals during the generation and evaluation of interoceptive predictions, thereby enhancing the integrity of self-representation. The discovery of Evrard et al. (2012) opens the possibility of more precise specification and localization of the role of VENs in this model or its successors. Adapted from (Seth et al., 2011). rodent studies) to neuroscience. A door has been opened by Evrard et al. (2012) , but much exciting work remains to be done.
